Few topics have dominated comparative politics so thoroughly as the study of democratization. In this vast literature, most prominent is Lipset’s (1959) hypothesis that democracy is sustained primarily by high levels of per capita income. Despite ongoing debate as to why this relationship exists, as well as related debates as to whether it is income per se that matters or instead its close correlates (including literacy, urbanization, inequality, and class dynamics), there nonetheless exists a broad consensus that democratization is rooted in the domestic process of economic modernization.

Huntington’s (1991) identification of the Third Wave of democracy led to a theoretical re-evaluation of this domestic-centric approach. He and others emphasized that international actors, such as the United States, the Catholic Church, and the U.S.S.R, and international processes, such as the diffusion of democracy between neighboring countries, also shape contemporary regime outcomes. In the last two decades this new international perspective has been elaborated in a variety of important studies that emphasize diverse factors such as the end of the Cold War and the subsequent ability of foreign aid conditionality to promote trends in Within-Legacy and Cross-Legacy Analysis of Democracy and Development

Tomila Lankina, London School of Economics and Political Science

The historical turn in comparative politics research on democracy and development is a welcome departure from earlier analytical paradigms focusing on temporally proximate causes. In this essay I highlight three key emerging and inter-related analytical strategies to deal with the methodologically thorny question of the persistence of history: a tendency to employ sub-national localities as units of observation; a shift from a focus in earlier studies on political-economic institutions and onto societal variables like human and cultural capital; and the bridging of geographical specialisms to pursue what I term “cross-legacy” comparisons. Based on my own comparative historical research on the legacies of colonialism and empire in developing and post-communist states, throughout the essay, I illustrate the utility, but also the challenges, of these analytical approaches.

Over the last two decades, a rich body of empirical scholarship has emerged employing the sub-national comparative research method. The merits of this approach are particularly evident when applied to studies of historical legacy effects to explain what came to be (continued on page 7)
Colonialism, Development and Democratization: Beyond National Colonial Legacies

Olukunle P. Owolabi, Villanova University

During the past decade, there has been a proliferation of empirical literature examining the long-term developmental and political consequences of colonialism. In contrast to earlier scholarship, which focused primarily on national colonial legacies (e.g. British vs. French or Spanish rule), recent scholarship has increasingly focused on how different economic models (e.g. settler vs. extractive colonization), administrative frameworks (e.g. direct vs. indirect rule) and state-society relations have affected long-term development and postcolonial democracy. This essay reviews this recent shift in empirical literature on colonialism, development, and democratization. Although this newsletter primarily focuses on comparative democratization, it is also important to address the consequences of colonial rule for socio-economic development, given that this is an important mechanism through which colonial institutions have shaped postcolonial regime outcomes. At present, development economics and sociology are more advanced than political science in exploring the long-term consequences of colonialism, although various theoretical and conceptual advances from these related disciplines can arguably be applied to comparative political research on democratization. By bridging the knowledge gap across the various social science disciplines, one may be able to draw additional insights on the complex interplay between development and democracy, which remains one of the enduring questions in political science.

The remainder of this essay will proceed as follows: First, I outline the major contributions of empirical literature examining the consequences of British rule for long-term development and postcolonial democracy. Recognizing the shortcomings of this literature, I review some of the recent scholarship investigating how distinct colonial institutions and actors (e.g. settler vs. extractive colonization; direct vs. indirect rule; and colonial missionaries) have affected long-term development and postcolonial democracy. Building on the contributions of these studies, I conclude by outlining some avenues for future comparative research on colonialism, development and democratization.

Looking Beyond the Usual Suspects: Integrating Religious Actors into the Study of Democratization and Economic Development

Robert D. Woodberry, National University of Singapore

A consensus has developed among many social scientists that colonial and pre-colonial institutions profoundly shaped societies’ prospects for both economic development and democratization. The question is no longer whether history matters, but why and how it matters. For example, controlling for British colonialism is virtually obligatory in cross-national analyses. Recent work attempts to measure legal institutions, economic inequality, land-tenure systems, civil society and other endogenous factors that were often transformed during the European colonial period. However, most research primarily demonstrates that statistical associations exist and may be causal. Less work analyzes carefully why some societies developed less inequality or greater protection for private property or who actually set up the schools and promoted legal protections.

One factor that scholars have almost completely ignored until recently is Protestant and Catholic missionaries. Yet, they were crucial catalysts of change. Colonizers varied in terms of educational enrollment, but missionaries provided the vast majority of educational institutions. Colonizers varied in the extent of printing, but missionaries generally created the first vernacular fonts, printed the first vernacular newspapers and books, and taught the first local printers their skills. Colonizers varied regarding the time when they banned slavery and in the extent to which they applied European legal standards to non-whites, but religious groups were generally the main promoters of colonial reform movements. In addition, the threat of conversion spurred local elites to emulate missionary education, printing, and civil society, creating a competitive expansion of resources available to new elites and non-elites. Thus, future research should include missionaries in its historical and statistical analyses. While the spread and activities of missionaries is not exogenous and must be explained, neither is the spread and
no exception to that: it brings together a set of notable scholars of the impact of colonial legacies on democratization and democratic longevity to confront the bearing of the past.

We feel confident that the readers will gain much from this issue, tackle as it does in a systematic way the influence of various aspects of the colonial era on democratic politics today. Matthew Fails and Jonathan Krieckhaus revisit the classic requisites of democracy, highlighting how often they are endogenous to longer-range social dynamics catalyzed by colonial rule. Tomila Lankina pushes scholars of legacies both to be attentive to sub-national research strategies and to recognize the theoretical gains to be made in cross-legacy research on democracy. Olukunle Owolabi focuses our attention on the causal importance of different modes of colonial rule and of different colonial-era actors in creating long-range political and social trajectories. And Robert Woodberry focuses on one set of colonial actors in particular—conversionary Protestant missionaries—in indirectly creating some crucial preconditions for the establishment of, and long-term viability of, stable liberal democratic politics. In short, these essays nicely illustrate a growing vein of research on the historical lineages of contemporary democracy and the increasing sophistication with which we as a discipline have begun to engage the role of history.

Finally, we owe special thanks to Emily Hauser, a PhD candidate in political science here at UF, whose own interest in the colonial determinants of democracy today motivated this issue. Emily's hard work in organizing and bringing to fruition these essays is much appreciated, as is the contribution that our set of authors has made both to our newsletter and to the study of comparative democratization.

- Staffan I. Lindberg and Benjamin Smith

Fails and Krieckhaus, CONTINUED

(continued from page 1)

democratization (Dunning 2004), the impact of dense linkage networks with Western democracies (Levitsky and Way 2005), and the tendency of neighboring countries to converge toward similar regime types (Brinks and Coggedge 2006) to name only a few.

In this essay we push this focus on international factors further, arguing that Great Power politics generally, and colonialism especially, is the root cause of democracy’s global proliferation. In making this argument we bring to the attention of democratization scholars a recent, vibrant, and interdisciplinary body of research that shows how the international system and era of overseas colonialism was fundamentally responsible for the “making of the modern world.” Although relatively few of these studies focus directly on the process of democratization, we nonetheless contend that taken as a whole this emerging research area suggests that colonialism has decisively shaped long-run global democratization.


Whereas “most scholars assume that external factors became important only in the 1970s or 1980s, at which point democracy was well established in the West,” (Narizny 2012: 342), we note that international actors drove democratization much earlier and more fundamentally than commonly thought. To begin with, at a high level of generality, we invoke two recent studies showing that the presence of a democratic hegemon in the international system accounts for nearly all successful democratization episodes in the modern era, and is in fact a necessary condition for the global proliferation of democracy.

We articulate this argument by making two distinct points. First, we introduce an international relations perspective to democratization studies by noting that a democratic hegemon is necessary for the global expansion of democracy. Second, we turn to a series of important domestic variables in democratization studies, including income per capita, human capital, inequality, and social cohesion, and argue that these widely accepted and seemingly ‘exogenous’ causes of democratization are largely a byproduct of the way in which European colonialism differentially shaped states and societies throughout the global periphery.

2. This is the subtitle of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002), perhaps the authors most closely associated with this literature.
relationship between modernization and democratization. Specifically, income per capita has a much stronger effect on democratization and consolidation during eras in which democratic hegemons controlled the international system. When democratic regimes such as Britain or the United States have dominated the globe, the proliferation of democracies proceeded apace, but when authoritarian regimes such as the Holy Alliance dominate the international system, democratization is less common, even when domestic modernization conditions are favorable.

Narizny (2012) utilizes counterfactual reasoning and historical evidence to argue even more forcibly that international actors are decisive. Two empirical facts are central to Narizny’s argument. First, the main waves of democracy essentially followed hegemonic wars in which the democratic power at the apex of the international system was victorious, including Britain’s military victory in World War I, the British and U.S. victory in World War II, and the victory of the U.S. over the (authoritarian) USSR in the late twentieth century. Second, the majority of all consolidated democracies began life under the direct or indirect influence of the Anglo-American democratic hegemons. These patterns underpin his “genealogical” explanation of democratization, where founding states reproduced their social, economic, and political institutions in the territories they control. As Narizny strikingly concludes, “Great Britain and the United States have played a key role in creating, maintaining, or reviving democracy in nearly every state at the core of the current international order” (p.342).

Considered together, these studies suggest that international actors are not merely a recent additional explanation for democratization, but rather constitute the essential geopolitical foundation for global democratization.

II. Economic Modernization

While articulating the importance of Great Powers politics, Boix and Narizny nonetheless endorse the conclusion of countless democratization studies, namely the propensity of a high level of income per capita to create and consolidate democratic regimes. Indeed, one of the most prominent debates in recent years concerns not whether income levels correlate with democracy, but rather why, with the principle debate concerning whether modernization increases the likelihood of transition to democracy or merely stabilizes democratic regimes that emerged for myriad other reasons (e.g. Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix and Stokes 2003; Epstein et al. 2006). Gassebner et al.’s (2013) extreme bounds analysis of democratic transition and democratic survival suggests that both versions hold some grain of truth.

Precise causal mechanisms aside, it is now conventional wisdom that income per capita sustains democracy. We therefore suggest that the scholarly community briefly reflect on where higher incomes come from, and whether these deeper causes might shed additional light on the determinants and spread of global democracy. After all, whatever it is that brought about such a fundamental social transformation as economic development may be sufficiently important that it yields independent effects on democratization.

To understand the origins of contemporary incomes, we invoke a recent conventional wisdom in economics which views current income levels around the globe as a byproduct of European colonialism. This view originates with Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s (2001; 2002) highly influential argument that European colonialism unfolded in varying fashions across the developing world, driven principally by the environmental conditions that colonists encountered when they arrived. Unfavorable conditions, such as dense indigenous populations and hostile disease environments, provided incentives for colonists to rule through extractive institutions, ranging from the encomienda system of ownership in Latin America to the establishment of authoritarian and absolutist states designed to extract cash crops in Africa. By contrast, more favorable conditions facilitated colonial settlement and the transplantation of European institutions that would prove favorable for long-run development, including systems of strong property rights.

Acemoglu et al.’s vision has certainly been contested, such as Albouy’s (2012) critique of their dataset. But most critics merely dispute their causal mechanism, rather than the general point that European colonialism drove contemporary incomes. Glaeser et al. (2004), for instance, provide evidence that human capital is an equally plausible intervening process. Our own work (Fails and Krieckhaus 2010) bifurcates the Acemoglu et al. thesis, in that we strongly endorse their vision in six unusual colonies where British settlement or capital investment transformed the territory, but we argue that outside of these six cases there is little evidence that property rights is an intervening variable between colonialism and contemporary income per capita.³

³. More generally, Lange et al. (2006) argue that greater levels of British colonialism is positively associated with long-run development in ex-colonies whereas greater levels of Spanish colonialism is associated with less development. For a recent discussion of British colonialism and democracy, see Lankina and Getachew (2012).
Serious debate continues as to the causal mechanisms at play, but in general there is now a broad sense that the global income distribution has “European origins” (Easterly and Levine 2012). In political science, book-length treatments show how colonialism powerfully shaped states and societies, and hence long-run development (e.g., Kohli 2004, Kriekhaus 2006, Mahoney 2010). In economics, Morck and Yeung (2011) highlight the extent to which the discipline now embraces history, and colonialism specifically, as an explanatory variable. In light of these recent literatures, one might say that the entire body of democratization research emphasizing modernization, from Lipset onward, has focused on an intervening variable between the era of colonialism and contemporary regime outcomes, rather than an exogenous cause in and of itself.

III. Human Capital and Education

Lipset’s (1959) original work not only identified GDP per capita as the master variable sustaining democracy but also noted that income is closely correlated with other social, political, and economic attributes, some of which might have independent effects on democracy. Lipset paid special attention to education, arguing that “education presumably broadens men’s outlooks, enables them to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremist and monist doctrines, and increases their capacity to make rational electoral choices” (p.79).

Interestingly, this focus on education is also echoed in the recent literature on colonialism. As noted above, Glaeser et al. (2004) modify Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s (2001) model of colonial settlement and extraction and argue that what matters is not the extent to which settlers brought institutions of private property but instead brought “themselves, that is, their human capital” (274). While their goal is to provide an alternative explanation of long-run development, for our purposes here, the more interesting point is that Glaeser et al. provide compelling empirical evidence that colonialism ushered in sweeping changes to the makeup of societies, which sowed the seeds of the literate, educated citizenries that sustain democracy.

In their previous work, two of the other contributors to this symposium further elaborate the nexus between colonialism, education, and democratization. Both authors also adopt a broader perspective on the colonial era, highlighting the role of missionary activities. Woodberry (2012), for instance, argues that the expansion of conversionary protestant missionaries provides the basis for key structural changes in colonized societies, including the development of mass education, widespread printing, and rising rates of literacy. Drawing on an impressive array of original data on the presence and timing of missionary activities, Woodberry demonstrates that this process provides a superior account of contemporary levels of democracy, even after controlling for standard predictors and alternative colonial-based arguments.

In a nice complement to this global analysis, Lankina and Getachew (2012) focus on sub-national variation in India and build original district-level datasets on historical Christian missionary activity, literacy, and measures of democratic participation and competition. Their mixed method empirical approach demonstrates that colonial-era mission activity had a strong influence on human capital, which itself explains variations in state-level democracy. By highlighting the variations within a single colonial territory, the authors further emphasize the causal importance of colonialism – albeit a religious dimension – in terms of education and democratization.

IV. Social Cleavages

Space constraints prevent us from offering a full discussion of other prominent factors in democratization studies, and their colonial antecedents, but we offer some brief comments. First, income inequality – the lynchpin of several influential theories of democratization (e.g. Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Ansell and Samuels 2010) – has also been profoundly shaped by the colonial era. Angeles (2007) notes a U-shaped relationship between colonial settlement and contemporary income inequality. Low European settlement was too small to shape income distributions, while European predominance led to the decimation of native populations and, accompanied by abundant land, a relatively egalitarian distribution of income. It is intermediate European settlement, when European settlers constituted a considerable but minority share of the population, as in Latin America, that colonists used their economic and political power to appropriate the best resources and establish a legacy of persistently high inequality. Van de Walle (2009) highlights an alternative channel by which colonialism shaped income inequality, namely how the limited ambitions of the colonial state in sub-Saharan Africa led to independent states dominated by narrow governing classes and reliance on clientelism, both features that prevented the emergence of more equitable income distributions.

Second, there is growing evidence that colonialism – broadly defined – influenced patterns of social identification and individual attitudes which shape regime outcomes.

Fails and Kriekhaus
Nunn (2008) shows how variations in the Atlantic Slave Trade account for differing levels of ethnic fractionalization across Africa; greater slave trade activity tended to weaken inter-village cooperation and dampen the development of larger communal and ethnic identities. In related work, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) show that the same process led to long-lasting cultural shifts, whereby contemporary citizens whose ancestors were victims of the slave trade are less trusting of fellow citizens, relatives, and local governments. While focused only on Africa, the authors nonetheless provide an important argument on the origins of inter-personal trust, an individual attitude which has been regularly linked to democratization (i.e. Inglehart 1997).

One important objection to our entire line of reasoning is that by highlighting the colonial roots of such variables, we have excluded any potential causal importance for factors within colonized territories, or more generally, have taken a position whereby all history is internationally determined. We do not endorse such an approach, and to clarify this point we note a variety of studies highlighting how domestic factors also influenced the behavior of colonists. Engermann and Sokoloff (2012), for instance, highlight how factor endowments, such as the suitability of land to the production of labor-intensive crops like sugar, shaped contemporary inequality, as colonists in such territories were more likely to rely on plantation agriculture, slave labor, and institutional frameworks that preserved economic and political inequalities over the long run. Gerring et al. (2011) and Harirri (2012) make related arguments, focusing on how the domestic attributes of potential colonies, including the strength of pre-colonial state institutions, can alter (and in some cases prevent) the diffusion of democratic institutions by great powers. While these arguments give some causal primacy to classic exogenous characteristics, including geography or the development of early states, each still fits squarely with our overall thesis on the importance of the international system for contemporary democratization outcomes.

**IV. Implications**

We have argued that the global expansion of democratic regimes, one of the most important transformations in world politics today, is inextricably linked to an earlier transformation of world politics, namely the era of Great Power Politics and the construction of colonial empires. Considered most broadly our aim for this essay is to alert scholars of democratization to the growing literature that underlies this claim, and to challenge such scholars to take the colonial origins of democracy and dictatorship seriously. At minimum, we suggest that democratization scholars reflect on Huntington’s methodological observation that “an explanation… is the place at which the mind comes to rest” (1991: 36). History is a chain of cause-and-effect, such that when we explain social science phenomena, we can peel back layers of causation like an onion. Democratization scholars have traditionally utilized variables such as income, human capital, inequality, and social identity as a set of explanations for the rise of democracy. If one peels away another layer, however, one finds that all of these variables are heavily structured by the deeper forces of Anglo-American hegemony and the way in which European colonialism shaped territories throughout the global periphery. Domestic explanations should be seen as operating within this larger geopolitical context.

This is not merely a matter of recognizing the European roots of democratization, but also a matter of re-thinking the causal process through which income and its correlates affect democracy. Compare, for instance, Lipset’s (1959) understanding of education in democratization versus Woodberry’s (2012) explanation. Lipset provides little insight into why education and democracy are correlated, save for speculation that democracy might generate “norms of tolerance” and reduce “extremism” (p.79). Woodberry, by contrast, provides a much more political and activist understanding of education, in which protestant missionaries actively sought to recruit citizens to their world view, and this led to a competitive struggle for people’s minds with existing elites. In this sense, education is part of a Christian mobilizing ethos, and is inherently a political process.

Reconsidering other ‘independent variables’ from this colonial perspective may lead scholars to similarly novel understandings of the causal processes at work. Is GDP per capita merely a mechanism to reduce class conflict and increase education, or is it perhaps reflective of a more general Europeanization of colonized lands, where British settlers simultaneously brought with them multi-faceted ideologies of property rights, consent of the governed, and human capital? In the latter conception, it is not exactly that wealth causes democracy but rather that British settlement generates a vast complex of transformations. Contemporary democratization, to a considerable extent, is the outcome of this colonially-induced transformation.

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because of the within-nation variation in the institutions that colonial rulers imposed or adapted in the colonies, generalizations derived from employing the “identity of the colonial power” analytical label are not appropriate for our understanding of the often varied nature of national and sub-national post-colonial pathways. A number of recent studies have analyzed the implications of the spatial diversity of colonial administrative configurations or institutional and governance preferences for the persistence of local developmental and democratic disparities. Yet these within-nation comparative studies in politics and political economy go much further than shedding light on the links between these spatially uneven colonial legacies and within-nation inequalities. Rather, they have helped generate insights for our understanding of the puzzle of the persistence of cross-national developmental and regime constellations as they relate to the effects of various types of institutions, practices, and actors, hitherto subsumed under the “colonial origin” rubric. For instance, sub-national analysis has enabled scholars to more systematically unpack and deconstruct the generic label of “colonial tutelage” and conceptually distinguish between Christian missionaries and colonial authorities; to highlight different types of land tenure practiced in the colonies as important variables shaping infrastructural development, schooling, and healthcare; and to identify the significance of local governance arrangements set up by western rulers for altering or reinforcing indigenous social control mechanisms and inequalities. I discuss this research agenda and its implications for explaining cross-national variations in the developmental pathways of nations with a variety of historical legacies, with reference to my own and other scholars’ work, in more detail below.

The second, paradigmatic, change in historical legacies research is a shift of emphasis from political-economic institutions onto the societal underpinnings of long-run democracy and development. Let me pursue further the example of colonial legacies. There is a long tradition of theorizing into the ostensibly democracy-boosting nature of British colonial institutional legacies—most notably Westminster-style parliamentary systems that the British set up in the colonies; these arguably favorably contrasted with the institutional legacies of the French, Spanish, Dutch, and Portuguese colonial powers. The premise that colonial political-legal institutional legacies are engines of the reproduction of patterns of global divergence in democracy and development is also present in the recent widely cited work by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (AJR). AJR employ settler mortality to instrument for institutions such as checks on government that Europeans introduced or neglected to introduce depending on whether they decided to settle in the various colonies.

The institutionalist paradigm dominating the “great divergence” scholarship came under attack in a paper by Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. For institutional scholarship on colonial legacies, see David B. Abernethy, "The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415–1980" (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Diamond, Democracy in Developing Countries; Weiner, Comparative Democratization; Mosse, The Dynamics of Global Dominance; and others.


3. For institutional scholarship on colonial legacies, see David B. Abernethy, The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415–1980 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Diamond, Democracy in Developing Countries; Weiner, Comparative Democratization; and others.
helped problematize the assumption of institutional drivers of the reproduction of historical legacy effects advanced in the seminal work of AJR, and, by implication, in other scholarship focusing on political-legal frameworks at the expense of societal variables which might be plausibly linked to the reproduction of patterns of global regime and developmental variations. One such variable is human capital, what Glaeser at al. call the “know-how,” of those who chose to settle in the various territories, or the “know-how” and skills of indigenous populations that colonial powers nurtured or undermined; it is this variable that colonial tutelage may well have captured, rather than institutions.

The research that I have conducted with my collaborator Lullit Getachew into the links between colonial legacies and sub-national democratic governance across India’s districts illustrates the importance of the human capital dimension in analyzing the persistence of history in space and time. In particular, we find that colonial-era literacy, female literacy in particular, is a significant predictor of post-colonial literacy and state-level democratic variation. Whether the various localities were directly or indirectly ruled by the British appears to have discernable effects only on male, but not female, literacy. What mattered more for human capital development, we find, is the presence of another set of colonial and indeed pre-colonial era actors—Christian missionaries, Protestant missionaries in particular—whom we distinguish from colonial authorities, and who have had profound effects on the development of literacy; the inter-generational transmission of literacy through family and church Bible readings; and the nurturing and reproduction of cultural values associated with democracy. Our sub-national methodological strategy enabled us to distinguish between missionary and colonial power effects; yet we did not possess cross-national data to more rigorously interrogate the widespread assumption that national-level government institutions introduced by colonial powers are key drivers of democratic and developmental variations among post-colonial nations. This is accomplished in Robert Woodberry’s masterful cross-national analysis of colonial-era Protestant missionary activity. Woodberry’s research supports our finding of the powerful human capital component of Christian missionary involvement in the colonies; these effects may well have been erroneously attributed to colonial institutions in previous scholarship.

Recent literature on the implications of pre-communist historical legacies for post-communist states’ democratic pathways likewise illustrates a shift in the analytical perspective away from institutional legacies—such as those related to the experience of having a particular bureaucratic tradition or exposure to Roman law—and onto the societal-cultural drivers of the persistence of history. This tendency is evident even in studies framed in institutional legacy terms, but which essentially point to the human capital dimension of the reproduction of historical legacy effects over time. For instance, in explaining the apparent links between pre-communist legacies and support for communist parties in the post-communist period among formerly socialist states, Keith Darden and Anna Grzymala-Busse highlight the importance of Imperial-era curriculum and literacy. In turn, they link the education variables to the institutional factor of sub-national cultural autonomy in the various imperial peripheries. Imperial-era cultural autonomy and advanced native schooling were arguably instrumental in helping to sustain anti-communist values in the communist period. My own research into the historical drivers of democratic variation in post-communist Russia’s regions likewise suggests that imperial literacy patterns help explain long term modernization. I find that even within the administrative boundaries of present-day Russia—including in overwhelmingly ethnically Russian areas—imperial era literacy continues to correlate strongly with post-communist regional modernization patterns. In most territories that are part of present-day Russia, the cultural autonomy, curriculum, and nationalism factors were not relevant to the same extent as they had been in imperial Russia’s areas with non-Russian minority populations that had relatively wide autonomy.


5. Keith Darden and Anna Grzymala-Busse, “The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the Communist Collapse,” World Politics 59 (October 2006): 83-115. For a discussion of institutional legacies such as a bureaucratic tradition or exposure to Roman law, see Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulfich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfedova, Radoslaw Markowski, and Gabor Toka, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For a discussion of the links between imperial literacy and post-communist modernization at a sub-national level in Russia, see Tomila Lankina,
What we are likely observing therefore is not the effects of past institutions of cultural autonomy and schooling with a national content, but, more generally, evidence of the spatial reproduction of human capital, which is in turn an important driver of democratic variation in post-communist settings.

Admittedly, the institutions and human capital variables are interrelated—the latter could be also conceptualized as a product of formal and informal societal institutions. The analytical distinction is nevertheless a useful one. Consider the universe of cases that had experienced institutional rupture between the past and newly established orders at the onset of communism. If we are observing patterns of reproduction of, say, higher levels of development or better quality democratic governance in some territories over others forty years after the imposition of the communist experiment, we cannot simply pin these patterns on the “legacy” of economic and political institutions associated with the pre-communist order if these had been eradicated by the communist states.

A more promising analytical strategy would be to probe into the societal underpinnings of the apparent reproduction of institutional legacies. This is the route that Leonid Peisakhin takes when he sets out to interview Ukrainian villagers residing in adjacent territories that in the past had formed part of Imperial Russian and Austrian borderlands. Peisakhin finds that communist legacies did not obliterate individual and familial values, which are passed on from one generation to the next, and which vary depending on which side of the fence one’s ancestors had resided in—Imperial Russian or Austrian. Employing a broad-brush analytical category of “institutional legacies” would not have sufficed to explain post-communist democratic variations absent a fine appreciation of the importance of the micro-societal, familial drivers of these variations. While past imperial institutions might have served as original triggers to the development of certain societal value orientations, they would stop short of explaining the reproduction of legacy effects. The distinction between original institutional triggers of the development of societal values and the micro-societal mechanisms of the reproduction of these values is crucial to understanding the persistence of “legacies” in various contexts. The family as an engine of conservation of societal value patterns has been of course the focus of rich and longstanding scholarship on cultural capital yet it has been side-lined in the “great divergence” debates that accorded center stage to political-economic institutions like checks on government, record of autocracy, or legal tradition.6

This brings me to the third, least developed analytical strategy to fine-grain historical legacy analysis, namely what I term “cross-legacy” comparisons. Much of what we know about the various types of legacies and how they might matter comes from what I call “within-legacy” or “common-legacy” comparative scholarship. The literature on colonial legacies would be an example of within-legacy comparative work whereby observations are selected based on common experience of colonialism, and the variation on the dependent variables of long-run economic growth or democracy are explained with reference to the institutions put in place by the various colonial powers. Another example of within-legacy comparisons is studies analyzing the universe of cases that share a common communist experience, but vary with respect to pre-communist legacies of imperial tutelage. Curiously, there has been very little cross-fertilization among these distinct bodies of legacies research.

Nearly twenty years ago, scholars studying Latin American transitions and those analyzing political and economic transformations in formerly communist states debated the utility of comparisons of the “south” with the “east.” The sharp divergences in Latin American and East European states’ twentieth century regime experiences led Valerie Bunce to muse that a comparative exercise of this sort is less about comparing apples and oranges, but one more akin to comparing apples with kangaroos. The analogy is applicable to comparisons of former colonies of Western states with Central and East European (CEE) countries sharing a legacy of communism. The universe of nations included in studies of Western colonialism comprises highly developed originally White settler states, on the one hand, and under-developed former colonies in the Global South, on the other. Post-communist CEE states cannot be straightforwardly placed into either of those categories. Furthermore, Western colonial powers are also distinct from the heir to the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, which imposed communist rule in much of the CEE region. These respective sets of states vary along a whole range of dimensions—notably institutional, cultural, ideological, “civilizational,” and economic. Nevertheless, as Terry

Lynn Karl, Philippe Schmitter, and indeed Valerie Bunce note, comparisons across even the very diverse universes of cases can be fruitful. On the one hand, they encourage scholars to work with concepts that are more general in nature than those applicable to a smaller range of more similar cases. On the other, they can force a serious rethink of paradigms generated by exploring the narrower range of cases, which share a particular set of common characteristics.

Let me follow on these points to illustrate how specifically analyses of long-run democratic and developmental effects of historical legacies involving “cross-legacy” comparisons could be fruitful. In particular, I highlight how “cross-legacy” comparisons can help problematize paradigms generated from analyzing a narrower universe of cases sharing a particular legacy; fine-grain our understanding of what type of legacy we are studying; establish what happens in terms of the reproduction of legacies when institutional rupture between some previous and newly established order occurs; and understand how and why some legacies appear to endure despite apparent rupture with past institutions, policies, and practices. Jason Wittenberg rightly problematizes the concept of a “historical legacy,” which, he argues, “confounds two analytically distinct though related conceptions of legacy.” These two conceptions are “precursors that are earlier instantiations of the outcome and precursors that are antecedent causes of the outcome.”

Based on a discussion of the universe of post-communist cases, Wittenberg notes the challenges of distinguishing between the two, particularly when trying to establish links between temporally distant “precursors” and contemporary outcomes that strongly correlate with these precursors. If we further pursue the example of institutional legacies discussed earlier in the essay, we can see how cross-legacy comparisons may help ascertain which type of legacy we are observing. Although “institutional legacies” have featured prominently in legacies scholarship, the precise mechanisms that link past institutions to contemporary outcomes are often underspecified. Does “institutional legacy” refer to the simple reproduction of past institutions, as would be the case with the institutions of parliamentary democracy that British colonial powers introduced and the post-colonial governments retained? Or do “institutional legacies” refer to institutions that had been established in some historically distant point in time, that were then dismantled, but nevertheless continue to exercise some indirect effect on long-term outcomes?


a policy or institution, but it could also be the product of original institutions kick-starting important processes, such as those related to the development of human or cultural capital, and it is the reproduction of spatial patterns of human and cultural capital variations that we may be observing rather than the effect of what Wittenberg refers to as “precursor” institutions.

In many post-colonial settings, the structures of government, legal systems, and civil service bureaucracies were retained or only partially reformed after the colonies acquired independence. These institutions may have kick-started important societal processes, which may constitute what Wittenberg conceptualizes as transmission mechanisms of particular colonial-period legacies. These processes may provide important clues for explaining cross-national variations in developmental and political regime pathways. Yet, because of the continuity in institutional reproduction in many post-colonial contexts, disentangling the effects of specific institutions from those of processes and patterns that they may have helped kick-start becomes problematic. One way of addressing this challenge is to conduct a natural quasi-experiment of comparing units with some form of institutional continuity with the past, as would be the case in many former colonies, and those where a much more radical institutional rupture occurred, as would be the case with post-communist states. This would be an example of cross-legacy research.

For instance, drawing on Banerjee and Iyer’s data and research into colonial land tenure in Indian districts, Lullit Getachew and I have comparatively analyzed the causal mechanisms linking serfdom and specific types of land tenure to long-run sub-national developmental and democratic variations in Russia and India. Because in Russia far more severe
institutional rupture occurred between the imperial and communist orders as compared to institutional shifts associated with India’s independence from the British colonial rule, we are able to more conclusively establish that the observed links between past institutions and long-term sub-national developmental variations in both cases are partly due to human capital reproduction, and cannot be always explained with reference to what Banerjee and Iyer call an institutional “overhang” effect.9 States with a legacy of communism can therefore represent useful comparative reference points for distinguishing between institutional and other legacies; for understanding why some types of legacies appear to endure over others; and for fine-tuning our analyses of the mechanisms of reproduction of past legacies.

In his fine essay “is the science of comparative politics possible?” Adam Przeworski refers to endogeneity as the “motor of history”—disentangling the effects of variables that evolved from some initial circumstances in the distant past and may be mutually interdependent and mutually reinforcing will remain a challenging task. The inter-disciplinary scholarly effort of recent years to plunge the depths of history further and further, multiplying the “whys” in the question of the “why of the why”; scaling down the unit of analysis; distinguishing between, and problematizing, different types of legacies; and pursuing comparative research across legacies will hopefully take us some way towards meeting this challenge.10

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Beyond National Colonial Legacies


Settler vs. “Extractive” Colonization

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson were among the first scholars to move beyond national colonial legacies with their path-breaking analysis of the developmental consequences of “settler” vs. “extractive” colonization. Using OLS regression analysis on a sample of 64 former colonies, Acemoglu et al. demonstrate that low mortality rates among European settlers at the onset of colonization predict higher levels of democracy in 1900, more institutional constraints on executive authority in 1900, and stronger property rights in 1985-95. Using colonial settler mortality as an instrument for institutional quality in 1985-95, 2SLS models also demonstrate a positive and statistically significant relationship between low settler mortality rates and per capita income in 1995.2 The authors propose the following mechanism to explain this outcome: choosing to settle in colonies where they faced low mortality rates, European settlers demanded and (typically obtained) political and economic institutions that guaranteed their individual liberties, thereby protecting themselves from the threat of expropriation by the colonial state. In colonies that lacked an extensive settler population, by contrast, colonial authorities established “extractive” institutions that limited individual civil liberties, allowing colonial elites to extract resources and exploit non-white labor. Accordingly, the extent of European settlement during the colonial era explains institutional variation among former colonies, which in turn accounts for the significant variation in economic development across former colonies today. Although Acemoglu et al. primarily investigates the colonial origins of economic development, future scholarship can also investigate the impact of settler vs. extractive colonization on mean levels of postcolonial democracy.

Direct vs. Indirect Rule

Recent scholarship has also investigated the impact of different legal-administrative institutions on long-term development and democratization, examining variation among countries colonized by the same European power. For example, Matthew Lange’s research explores the distinct developmental and political consequences of direct vs. indirect British rule. Whereas direct rule depended on a uniform bureaucratic state apparatus that resembled the modern European state, indirect rule relied heavily on “customary law” as

2. See Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” The American Economic Review 91 (December 2001): 1369-1401. OLS regression analysis yields the same result, regardless of whether institutional quality (1985-95) or settler mortality rates are used as the primary independent variable. The 2SLS results also hold regardless of whether the sample includes or excludes the high performing British settler colonies (United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), and whether the sample includes or excludes African countries, given their low economic performance. The results are also robust to the addition of control variables for latitude, religious composition, national colonial legacies (British or French) and French legal origin (Acemoglu et al. 2001: 1386-1389).
traditional indigenous elites served as intermediaries between the colonial state and the general population. Lange's index of indirect rule measures the percentage of legal cases heard in “customary” courts overseen by traditional chiefs in 1955, rather than British magistrates, in common law courts.1 British colonies with extensive European settlement (e.g. Canada and New Zealand) were directly governed. Among colonies with limited European settlement, indirect rule ranged from 0 percent in “commercial colonies” (e.g. Singapore, Hong Kong) and “plantation colonies” (e.g. Jamaica, Trinidad, Mauritius, Sri Lanka), to over 80 percent in certain African countries with overwhelmingly rural and indigenous populations (e.g. Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda). Using OLS regression analysis, Lange demonstrates a negative and statistically significant relationship between indirect British rule and socio-economic development (logged per capita income, average school attainment, and infant mortality rates in 1970 and 2000). Similarly, indirect rule predicts poorer governance, less bureaucratic effectiveness, weaker rule of law, higher governmental government during the 1990s, and lower mean levels of democracy, 1972-2000. The OLS models control for a number of competing explanations including European settlement, ethnic fractionalization, and logged pre-colonial density, and the empirical results remain robust regardless of whether the highly developed British “settler colonies” are included or excluded from the analysis. Lange further explores the causal mechanism linking indirect rule to poor developmental outcomes and the absence or breakdown of postcolonial democracy through case studies of Sierra Leone, Mauritius, Botswana and Guyana.4 Lange’s nuanced distinction between direct vs. indirect rule makes an important contribution to our understanding of the varied developmental and postcolonial regime outcomes across the former British Empire, demonstrating the limitations of national colonial dummies.

Colonial missionaries, human capital and postcolonial democracy

Another recent trend has been to investigate the long-term developmental and political consequences of colonial missionary activity, given that missionaries were often independent actors with distinct interests, goals and motivations from colonial settlers, merchants and administrators. In most colonial empires, Christian missionaries played a significant role in providing education, although the relationship between missionaries and the colonial state varied significantly across time and space. Missionaries enjoyed the most autonomy in British colonies after 1813, as the introduction of religious liberty and liberal-plural church-state relations facilitated competition among different Christian denominations to provide education and other public services. In many British colonies, state funds were also used to fund denominational schools. In the French Empire, by contrast, Republican laïcité legislation forbade the use of public funds to support denominational schools after 1903, resulting in lower levels of educational attainment. And in the Spanish, Portuguese and Belgian Empires, where the Catholic Church enjoyed a state monopoly over “native education,” the provision of education also remained limited, given the absence of competition.5 Consequently, the historic presence of missionaries and the nature of colonial church-state relations have had profound consequences for educational attainment, economic growth, and postcolonial democracy in much of the developing world.

The most ambitious and comprehensive empirical study on colonial missionaries is Robert Woodberry’s recent article in the American Political Science Review. This study demonstrates a strong empirical relationship between the historical presence of Protestant missionaries, educational attainment and postcolonial democracy. Woodberry’s argument is as follows: conversionary Protestants established mission schools to enable the masses to read the bible in their own languages. These schools promoted mass literacy, socio-economic development, and the emergence of a middle class. Mission schools also taught organizational skills, enabling the rise of mass printing, civil society and new social movements, which agitated for social and political reforms, and ultimately facilitated democratization. Where the historical presence of Protestant missionaries was limited, by contrast, educational opportunities remained much more limited, preventing the rise of a middle class, limiting societal demands for social and political reforms, and ultimately hindering postcolonial democracy. Testing his argument on a sample of 142 “non-Western” countries, Woodberry finds that several variables related to the historical presence of Protestantism (e.g. per capita Protestant missionaries in 1923; percent evangelized in 1900; number of years of exposure to Protestant missions) predict higher mean levels of democracy between 1950 and 1994. Perhaps more strikingly,


the British colonial dummy loses its statistical significance once the historic presence of Protestant missionaries is controlled for. Furthermore, these results remain robust to statistical controls for geography, current religious composition, current levels of socio-economic development, as well as historical levels of European settlement and socio-economic development.\footnote{6}{Robert D. Woodberry, “The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy,” 244-274.}

The statistical significance of the Protestant missionary variables (rather than historic levels of European settlement, or precolonial urbanization and population density) as predictors of democracy also demonstrates the robustness of Woodberry’s argument vis-à-vis Acemoglu et al’s earlier hypothesis on European settlement.

In a similar vein, Lankina and Getachew examine how colonial institutions and the historic presence of Christianity affected literacy outcomes and postcolonial democracy in India, testing the theoretical arguments of Robert Woodberry against those of Matthew Lange. This study makes two important contributions to our understanding of the relationship between colonialism, development and postcolonial democracy: first, it disaggregates the institutional legacies of colonialism (direct vs. indirect rule) from the legacy of Christian evangelization during the colonial era. Second, it exploits district-level variation, thereby contributing to our knowledge of how colonial institutions, religion, modernization (urbanization), and human capital have affected subnational democracy in India—Lankina and Getachew examine voter participation and partisan competition in state-level elections. In this study, Christianity predicts significantly higher rates of male, female, and total literacy during the colonial (1911-1931) and postcolonial eras (1971-2001). Literacy rates inherited from the colonial era also predict higher levels of postcolonial democracy (1971-2001). Interestingly, direct British rule also predicts higher rates of male and total literacy, but its effect on female literacy is insignificant. At the same time, the impact of direct rule on postcolonial democracy is insignificant once literacy is controlled for. These results suggest that in the case of India, at least, Christianity has had a more profound impact on literacy and postcolonial democracy than direct British rule. The authors claim that this reflects the more elitist (and limited) nature of government vis-à-vis mission schools during the colonial era.\footnote{7}{See Tomila Lankina and Lullit Getachew, “Mission or Empire, Word or Sword? The Human Capital Legacy in Postcolonial Democratic Development,” American Journal of Political Science 56 (April 2012): 465-483.} Nevertheless, given that these data are from a single country that is often considered as the exception par excellence to most theoretical explanations of democratization, the debate over whether Christian missionaries (Woodberry) or colonial institutions (Lange, Acemoglu et al, La Porta et al) are stronger predictors of long-term development and postcolonial democracy remains unresolved, and this remains a fruitful area for future empirical research.

Avenues for future research:
This essay concludes by outlining four possible avenues for future research on colonialism, development, and democratization.

First, future research should continue the current trend of moving beyond national colonial legacies, recognizing the diversity of economic models, administrative institutions, and state-society relations that existed among countries colonized by the same European power. In this vein, one of my current working papers explores the developmental and political consequences of forced settlement (the mass import of non-indigenous African slaves and/or Asian indentured laborers to recently settled plantation colonies) vis-à-vis colonial occupation (European domination over indigenous societies and populations). By the end of the colonial era (c. 1960), however, forced settlement colonies had significantly higher adult literacy rates than colonies of occupation, and they have also enjoyed significantly higher mean levels of postcolonial democracy. This paper sheds light on this puzzle, exploring the variation in administrative strategies and citizenship policies across the two types of colonies. Administrative reforms following the abolition of slavery extended greater civil liberties and social and in some cases, political rights to emancipated slaves who were ultimately recognized as metropolitan subjects or citizens. In colonies of occupation, by contrast, the colonial states constructed various “native codes” that denied basic individual liberties to indigenous populations. These distinct legal-administrative institutions seem to have had lasting consequences for social development and postcolonial democracy.\footnote{8}{See Olukunle P. Owolabi, “Literacy and Democracy After Slavery? The Long-Term Consequences of Forced Settlement and Colonial Occupation in the Developing World,” paper presented at American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA (September 2012).}

Second, future research on colonial legacies can also contribute to broader debates about the relationship between development and democracy. At present, the economics and sociology literature on the developmental consequences of colonialism is more advanced than the political science literature on the consequences of colonialism for...
postcolonial democracy. As these outcomes are likely interconnected, future research can systematically investigate how patterns of socioeconomic development inherited from the colonial era have affected postcolonial democracy. Examining this relationship might reveal some surprising empirical findings that could contribute to general knowledge on the relationship between development and democracy. For example, my working paper on the developmental and political consequences of forced settlement vis-à-vis colonial occupation finds that among countries decolonized after World War Two, 1960 adult literacy rates predict significantly higher mean levels of postcolonial democracy, whereas the impact of per capita GDP is statistically insignificant. This suggests that colonial systems that promoted mass education have had favorable consequences for postcolonial democracy, even if colonialism did not contribute significantly to substantial industrialization or economic development. Following up on this point, future research could systematically examine which of the various developmental indicators inherited from the colonial era—e.g., adult literacy, per capita income, economic inequality, urbanization or industrialization rates, etc.—have the strongest impact on postcolonial democracy.

Third, future research could be more attentive to historical periodization, given that colonial institutions often varied over time within individual countries. The dynamic nature of colonialism is not captured well in large-N statistical studies, which often examine how historical institutions at a specific moment (e.g. indirect rule c. 1955; Protestant missionaries in 1931) affected long-term development or postcolonial regime outcomes. While some of these factors are relatively static, countries often experienced significant social or political reforms that arguably reversed, undermined, or mitigated the consequences of earlier institutional legacies. The success of postcolonial democracy may reflect the way in which institutional crises were resolved during the run-up to independence (or even shortly afterward), rather than the economic or political institutions that existed during the height of the colonial era. Case studies and small-N studies are especially useful for answering these types of questions, which depend on more focused process-tracing. There are already some excellent case studies that outline the developmental consequences of decolonizing reforms in individual countries, and small-N comparisons can be useful for explaining divergent postcolonial outcomes in countries with a similar colonial heritage (e.g. India vs. Pakistan). Yet, additional case studies would be useful for exploring other “deviant” cases such as Costa Rica and Belize, or for comparing countries with similar colonial histories but divergent postcolonial outcomes.

Finally, future research could devote more attention to how distinct colonial institutions affected development and/or postcolonial regime outcomes at the state or local level within a single country. In many countries, the colonial experience varied significantly across subnational units, although there is very little scholarship investigating the consequences of this for subnational postcolonial governance. Lankina and Getachew’s recent study on India is certainly a step in the right direction, and future scholarship could examine similar variation in countries like Brazil, Malaysia, Nigeria, South Africa, or the United States, where the colonial experience varied significantly across subnational units. Because most democracy indicators focus on national, rather than subnational government, this type of research remains underdeveloped at present. Nevertheless, it would be a fruitful avenue for further research, given the growing empirical literature on subnational democracy.

In sum, I have highlighted four important ways in which future research could contribute to empirical knowledge on colonialism, development and democratization: by highlighting other forms of institutional variation within and across different colonial empires; through more rigorous testing of the relationship between development and democracy; by using qualitative methods that are more attentive to historical periodization within the colonial era; and by exploring subnational variations in colonial institutions and postcolonial governance. Each of these avenues can contribute significantly to empirical knowledge on comparative democratization, while at the same time, contributing to interdisciplinary linkages between political science, development economics, sociology and modern history.

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9. Olukunle P. Owolabi, “Literacy and Democracy After Slavery?” The positive contribution of colonial literacy to postcolonial democracy is also demonstrated in Lankina and Getachew’s 2012 study on India.

activity of European colonizers, settlers, or institutions.

In an article in the *American Political Science Review* (The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy, 2012) I argued historically and statistically that conversionary Protestants (CPs) heavily influenced both the rise of stable democracy in Europe and North America and the spread of stable democracy around the world. However, the link between CPs and democracy was mostly indirect because CPs catalyzed religious liberty, mass education, mass printing, newspapers, voluntary organizations, and colonial reforms, thereby creating conditions that made stable, liberal democracy more likely. Statistically, the historic prevalence of Protestant missionaries explains about half the variation in democracy in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceania and removes the impact of most variables that dominate current statistical research about democracy. Yet, to understand why this statistical result is plausible, it is important to understand the history that underlies it.

**Historical Argument**

The association between Protestantism and democracy did not begin with the missionary movement. Calvinists and Nonconformists contributed to democratic theory and institutions out of a concern to limit state power, to guard against the corruptibility of all humans and human institutions, and to justify rebellion against rulers who persecuted them. Later democratic activists used these ideas and institutions (in combination with others) to establish representative democracy. In addition, Nonconformists (i.e., non-state-supported Protestant denominations) historically suffered from persecution by governments and state churches. Thus they fought both for religious liberty and against state interference in civil society. In the eighteenth through early twentieth centuries, CPs generally sided with enlightenment elites against state churches and their conservative allies. When they lacked this religious support, enlightenment elites had a small power base and typically set up either autocratic or unstable and illiberal democratic regimes.

In Protestant Europe, conflict between CPs and defenders of state churches divided economic and political elites and often created incentives to extend voting rights to excluded groups. Moreover, CPs helped foster conditions that facilitated stable democratization.

CPs such as Protestant missionaries wanted people to read the Bible in their own language and wanted to facilitate lay religious involvement. Thus, as CPs tried to spread their faith, they catalyzed mass education, mass printing, and civil society—namely religious liberty, mass education, mass printing, and civil society that monopolized these resources. Protestants themselves did not always provide the most educational, printing, and civil society resources, but Protestant initiatives spurred others to invest heavily in these areas and to pressure governments to create schools that restricted Protestant content. These resource transfers to non-elites helped alter the class structure, fostered the rise of political parties and nonviolent political movements, and facilitated broader political participation.

Finally, non-state missionaries moderated colonial abuses, particularly when abuses undermined conversions and primarily in British colonies (where CPs had greater influence). To reach their religious goals, mission supporters often punished abusive colonial officials and counterbalanced white settlers, which fostered the rule of law, encouraged less violent repression of anticolonial political organization, and facilitated peaceful decolonization.

Of course, Protestant economic and political elites were as selfish as anyone else. Protestant slave owners fought slave literacy, and Protestant settlers exploited indigenous people. Even Protestant missionaries sometimes harmed democracy: for example in South Africa, Afrikaans missionaries helped create the ideology of apartheid. Moreover, in some contexts Protestant missions seemed to have indirectly fostered religious violence. Still, when missionaries were financially independent of the state, slave owners, and white settlers, they undermined these elite co-religionists in ways that fostered democracy.

To those not trained in mission history the previous description of missions influences may sound too rosy. There is insufficient space in this article to discuss the history that underlies these generalizations or describe the complexity within the mission movement. Some missionaries were clearly racist and insensitive, and missionary behavior disrupted local societies, but if the main consequence of Protestant missionaries was violence and social deterioration, missions would not have a robustly positive association with democracy, economic development, education, health, newspaper circulation, voluntary association membership, and so on. Ultimately our goal should not be to force a conclusion, but to rigorously test what missionaries’ impact was and whether their activity explains previous research results.

**Statistical Evidence**

As mentioned previously, Protestant missions has a strong statistical association with liberal democracy and removes the impact of many factors.

associated with democracy in previous research; e.g., who colonized a country, European settlement, Islam, oil, etc. In fact, despite the large literature analyzing these factors, they do not add any explanatory power to the model with Protestant missions as the only independent variables. The association between Protestant missions and democracy remains robust even when we control for 59 variables associated with the spread of missions and of colonization, colonial investment in legal institutions, with how valuable missionaries and colonizers considered each territory, and with pre-colonial conditions such as settler mortality, pre-colonial population density, and pre-colonial urbanization.

Changing the measure of democracy does not matter, nor does instrumental variable analysis. The association between missions and democracy is consistent in different regions of the world (e.g., Africa, Asia, islands) and even at the subnational level. Moreover, Protestant missions is significantly and robustly associated with the various intervening mechanisms (e.g., with greater newspaper circulation, higher educational enrollments, more GDP, more voluntary associations per capita, and so on).

Although any piece of this evidence can be critiqued, the cumulative evidence makes finding a consistent alternative explanation difficult. If alternative explanations are not consistent between contexts and methods, it is not clear why we should prefer them over an explanation that is consistent. Moreover, the association between Protestant missions and democracy is so strong, that if some unmeasured factor caused all of it, this omitted variable(s) would have to be as correlated with democracy as is the two measures of democracy used in the APSR article are with each other and simultaneously more than twice as correlated with Protestant missions as any of the three measures of Protestant missions used in the APSR article are with each other. That seems highly unlikely.

Finally, neither the history nor the statistics should be evaluated in isolation. Each mitigates weaknesses in the other approach. The history helps make the strong statistical results plausible, and the statistics demonstrates that the historical arguments are not a selection of unrepresentative stories.

Subsequent Research – Missions and Other Outcomes
Research completed after the APSR article consistently confirms missionaries’ impact on long-term development. The prevalence of missionaries in the 19th and early 20th centuries predicts educational enrollments both cross-nationally and sub-nationally. Controlling for missionary activity both removes the differences in education between colonizers and explains much of the variation in education within British colonies.

Yet on average, Protestant missionaries went to places that had less education prior to their arrival, but these places garnered more education after their arrival. Or more technically, if there were no missionaries at time 1, there is a negative association between Protestant missionaries at time 2 and education at time 1, but a positive association between Protestant missionaries at time 2 and education at time 3. Similarly, if there were no missionaries at time 3 there is a negative relationship between Protestant missionaries at time 4 and education at time 3, but a positive relationship between Protestant missionaries at time 4 and educational enrollments at time 5, and so on. Statistical research also shows an association between Protestant missionaries and both current book publishing and newspaper circulation.2

Natural experiments in Nigeria and Togo also reveal the importance of missions. In Nigeria, colonial officials prevented missionaries from working north of an arbitrary straight line. This line cut ethnic groups in half and does not correspond to anything on the ground, yet even now educational rates are higher just south of that line (where missionaries worked) than just north of that line (where they were restricted). Similarly, German Togoland was split between the French and British after World War I. The British allowed missionaries free access in southern Togoland, but restricted them in the north. The French restricted mission access in both the northern and southern parts of their portion of Togoland. Educational enrollments are currently higher on the British side of this border in the south (where missionaries were allowed), but not in the north where both colonizers restricted them.3

Similarly, the prevalence of Protestant missionaries predicts subsequent economic development even after controlling for economic development before the missionaries arrived. The natural experiment in Nigeria also demonstrates that economic development is higher just south of the mission-restriction-line than just north of it. The association between missions and development is also robust to instrumental variable analyses. For example, in China the prevalence of Protestant missionaries and Christian converts in the early 20th century is associated with greater economic development now, even if scholars instrument missionary migrations either with missionary migration caused by the Boxer Uprising or with the prevalence of droughts and floods in the late 19th or early 20th century. The droughts and floods instrument is particularly compelling. Missionaries moved to areas that experienced droughts and floods to conduct disaster relief, and then stayed – building schools, hospitals, and so on. Moreover, droughts and floods are unlikely to cause economic development through a different mechanism. Consistent with this theory, when the authors instrument either missionaries or converts with droughts and floods in either the late 19th or the early 20th centuries (when they influenced the flow of missionaries) both instrumented missionaries and instrumented converts are associated with economic development now. However, floods and droughts prior to the mid-19th century or after the mid-20th century (when they did not influence the flow of missionaries) are negatively associated with economic development.4


Alternative Explanations
Several studies make arguments that could potentially explain the association between Protestant missions and democracy, economic development, and so on. First, perhaps colonial elections are the crucial factor, not missions. However, controlling for colonial elections does not remove the association between Protestant missions and democracy – at least in preliminary analyses (personal communication with Steve Wilkinson).

Second, perhaps settler mortality influenced the flow of missionaries and is the true explanations of legal protections. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson’s (AJR) measure of European mortality in former colonies has been critiqued for decisions that bias it towards the authors’ preferred conclusions and for the results being driven by Hong Kong, Singapore, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Yet, the measure is still widely used and has garnered thousands of citations.5

However, neither AJR’s mortality variable nor their “urbanization in the year 1500” variable significantly predicts democracy, property rights, corruption, rule of law or government efficiency after controlling for Protestant missions.6 The only way to make AJR’s mortality variable predict economic institutions after controlling for the spread of Protestant missions is to use statistical slight-of-hand by coding the number of Protestant missionaries in the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand and dividing by the total population. However, the vast majority of Protestant religious work in these countries was not counted as missions – only work among native peoples, Asians, and Jews. Thus, in four Protestant majority countries that have unusually high literacy, economic development, rule of law and democracy, inappropriate coding makes “Protestantism” seems to have little impact. This problem is accentuated both when length of Protestant missions is not controlled and when the number of Protestant missionaries is counted in 1911 for the four neo-Europes and in 1923 for all other countries.

Third, perhaps societies that had early states or early agricultural transitions blocked European settlement, limited the impact of European colonization and restricted Protestant mission influence, thus are less democratic.7 Yet, in a head-to-head test neither state antiquity nor the date of the agricultural transition adds any explanatory power to the model predicting democracy with Protestant missions (see Table 1, models 2-5). Thus, the association between ancient state and technological development on one hand and democracy on the other is likely either spurious or works through its impact on the spread of Protestant missions. Even controlling for the extent of European language use or the percentage of the population with European ancestry does not remove the impact of Protestant missions: see models 6-9.


Thus, the association between Protestant missions and democracy, economic development, etc., seems amazingly robust and challenge standard accounts of the origin and spread of liberal democracy. The statistical association between Protestant missions and democracy is exceptionally strong and removes so many factors that dominate current research that even if one thinks that the relationship between CPs and democracy is spurious, the associations highlighted in most published research are undermined—either because they do not control for Protestant missions or because they do not control for the omitted variable(s) that causes the missions–democracy relationship. Either way, much of what we think we know about the roots of democracy needs reevaluation.

These arguments also challenge a number of important theories about building blocks of democracy and anti-colonial movements: for example, they challenge Habermas’ (1989) interpretation of the rise of the public sphere; Benedict Anderson’s (1991) argument about the roots of nationalism; and Charles Tilly (1995) and Sidney Tarrow’s (1998) arguments about the rise of civil society and modular, non-violent social movement tactics. While missionaries are probably not the only explanation for the outcomes discussed in this article, they seem to be an important and neglected part of the explanation. At a minimum, the literature on colonial legacies must now analyze why particular colonizers supported mass education and legal protections in some places and not others, and expand the actors they research beyond the usual suspects.

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| Table 1: Robust Regression Testing Impact of Protestant Missions, State Antiquity, Agricultural Transition, European language Use and European Ancestry on Mean Liberal Democracy 1950-1994.1 |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 | Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 |
| Years of Protestant Missions | .12*** | .13*** | .13*** | .15*** | .15*** | .13** | .13*** | .15*** | .16*** |
| ( .03) | ( .05) | ( .05) | ( .04) | ( .04) | ( .04) | ( .04) | ( .04) | ( .04) |
| Number Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. In 1923 | 4.04*** | 5.17* | 5.08* | 3.98+ | 3.75* | 6.43*** | 7.93*** | 3.96+ | 5.16* |
| ( 1.18) | ( 2.33) | ( 2.48) | ( 2.27) | ( 2.26) | ( 2.13) | ( 1.95) | ( 2.26) | ( 2.28) |
| Percent Evangelized by 1900 | .29*** | .26*** | .26*** | .29*** | .28*** | .28*** | .05 | .29*** | .18* |
| ( .05) | ( .05) | ( .06) | ( .05) | ( .05) | ( .08) | ( .05) | ( .08) |
| Pre 1500 State Antiquity | - .96 | - .94 | - ( .77) |
| Date of Agricultural Transition | 31.42*** | |
| Percent Who Speak a European Language | |
| Percent with European Ancestry | 24.75+ | |
| ( 3.48) | ( 4.33) | ( 5.18) | ( 3.87) | ( 5.45) | ( 3.86) | ( 3.52) | ( 3.86) | ( 3.87) |
| N | 142 | 105 | 105 | 115 | 115 | 117 | 117 | 115 |
| Pseudo R-squared Robust Reg. | .466 | .358 | .356 | .394 | .409 | .399 | .481 | .398 | .411 |
| R-Squared OLS | .433 | .351 | .351 | .390 | .393 | .400 | .449 | .393 | .409 |

1 Data come from Hariri, “The Autocratic Legacy”; and Woodberry, “The Missionary Roots”. Robust regression is rreg in Stata. The technique minimizes the effect of influential cases.
Nominations Encouraged: Comparative Democratization Section Awards For 2014 APSA Convention

The Comparative Democratization Section will present five awards for scholarly work at the 2014 APSA annual meeting in Washington: the Linz Prize for Best Dissertation, and Best Book, Best Article, Best Field Work, and Best Paper prizes. Members are strongly encouraged to submit nominations (including, for several awards, self-nominations) to the appropriate committees listed below. Please also forward this information to colleagues and graduate students. We ask you to note the eligibility criteria, deadlines for submissions, and materials that must accompany nominations; direct any queries to the committee chairs.

1. Juan Linz Prize for Best Dissertation in the Comparative Study of Democracy:
   Given for the best dissertation in the Comparative Study of Democracy completed and accepted in the two calendar years immediately prior to the APSA Annual Meeting where the award will be presented (2012 or 2013 for the 2014 Annual Meeting). The prize can be awarded to analyses of individual country cases as long as they are clearly cast in a comparative perspective. A hard copy of the dissertation, accompanied by a letter of support from a member of the dissertation committee, should be sent to each member of the prize selection committee.
   Deadline: March 14, 2014

   Committee Chair:
   Gwyneth McClendon
   Department of Government
   Harvard University
   1737 Cambridge Street, CGIS K207
   Cambridge, MA 02138
   gmccclendon@gov.harvard.edu

   Committee Members:
   John D. Stephens
   University of North Carolina
   Department of Political Science
   GEC 3211
   Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3449
   jdsteph@unc.edu

   Noam Lupu
   University of Wisconsin-Madison
   Department of Political Science
   110 North Hall
   1050 Bascom Mall
   Madison, WI 53706
   lupu@wisc.edu

2. Best Book Award
   Given for the best book in the field of comparative democratization published in 2013 (authored, co-authored, or edited). Copies of the nominated book should be sent to each committee member in time to arrive by March 14, 2014. Books received after this deadline cannot be considered.
   Deadline: March 14, 2014

   Committee Chair:
   Milan Svolik
   University of Illinois
   Department of Political Science
   420 David Kinley Hall, MC-713
   1407 W Gregory Drive
   Urbana, IL 61801
   msvolik@illinois.edu

   Committee Members:
   Michael Coppedge
   University of Notre Dame
   Kellogg Institute for International Studies
   130 Hesburgh Center
   Notre Dame, IN 46556
   coppedge.1@nd.edu

   John A. Doces
   Bucknell University
   Department of Political Science
   Academic West 233
   Lewisburg, PA 17837
   jad056@bucknell.edu

3. Best Article
   Single-authored or co-authored articles focusing directly on the subject of democratization and published in 2013 are eligible. Nominations and self-nominations are encouraged. Copies of the article should be sent by email to each of the committee members.
   Deadline: March 14, 2014

   Committee Chair:
   Robert D. Woodberry
   National University of Singapore
   Department of Political Science
   Block AS1, #04-47
   11 Arts Link, Singapore 117573
   polwr@nus.edu.sg

   Committee Members:
   John Gerring
   Boston University
   Department of Political Science
   232 Bay State Road
   Boston, MA 02215
   jgerring@bu.edu

4. Best Field Work:
   This prize rewards dissertation students who conduct especially innovative and difficult fieldwork. Scholars who are currently writing their dissertations or who complete their dissertations in 2013 are eligible. Candidates must submit two chapters of their dissertation and a letter of nomination from the chair of their dissertation committee describing the field work. The material submitted must describe
the field work in detail and should provide one or two key insights from the evidence collected in the field. The chapters may be sent electronically or in hard copy directly to each committee member.

**Deadline:** March 14, 2014

**Committee Chair:**
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Kellogg Institute for International Studies  
302 Hesburgh Center  
Notre Dame, IN 46556  
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**Committee Members:**
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Universidad Torcuato Di Tella  
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Blavatnik School of Government  
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United Kingdom  
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**Call for Applications: The 4th Annual Berlin Summer School in Social Sciences:**
The 4th Berlin Summer School in Social Sciences will take place in Berlin, Germany from July 20 to August 3, 2014. The school aims to promote young researchers by strengthening their methodological understanding in linking theory and empirical research. The two week program creates an excellent basis for the advancement of their current research designs. In the first week the school addresses the key methodological challenges of concept-building, causation/explanation and micro-macro-linkage that occur in almost all research efforts and strives for a clarification of the epistemological implications underlying methodological paradigms. In the second week, these methodological considerations are applied to central empirical fields of research in political science, sociology, and their intersections with other disciplines. In this second part of the program participants are assigned to four thematic groups according to their own research topics. The thematic areas cover “Governance, Politics and Processes of Decision-Making,” “Citizenship, Migration and Diversity,” “Social Struggle and Globalization,” and “Politics, Societies and Institutions under Economic Constraints.”

The course encompasses a varied format of lectures, workshops, seminars, and one-to-one consultations. During the summer school participants will also have the opportunity to present and intensely discuss their own work and approaches and will be provided with hands-on advice for their research designs. The school brings together a faculty of renowned international and Berlin-based scholars. Among the confirmed international lecturers are Donatella Della Porta (EUI), John Foran (UC Santa Barbara), Marion Fourcade (UC Berkeley), Gary Goertz (University of Notre Dame), Macartan Humphreys (Columbia University), Wendy Olsen (University of Manchester), and Beverly Silver (Johns Hopkins University).

The Berlin Summer School is a joint endeavor of the Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences (BGSS) at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. It is co-funded by the two institutions. Moreover, it receives generous funding from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). Details on travel grants and tuition fees can be found on our webpage. The international summer school is open to up to 50 PhD candidates, advanced master students and young Post-Docs. The call for applications has opened. Applications can be submitted online via the application form on the summer school webpage until **March 31, 2014**. The decisions of the selection committee will be communicated to the applicants at the beginning of April. For more information, please visit our webpage at www.berlinsummerschool.de. If you have additional questions, please directly contact the organizing team at summerschool.bgss@hu-berlin.de

**NEWS FROM MEMBERS:**
Claire L. Adida, assistant professor of political science, University of California San Diego, published *Immigrant Exclusion and Insecurity in Africa* (Cambridge University Press) in March 2014. Through a mix of fieldwork, survey data, and in-
depth interviews, the book describes the experience of immigrant communities and cultural integration in the developing world.


Sheila Carapico, professor of political science and international studies, University of Richmond, published Political Aid and Arab Activism: Democracy Promotion, Justice, and Representation (Cambridge University Press) in November 2013. Carapico examines questions facing Arab activists and transnational programs promoting rule of law, electoral reform, women’s empowerment, and civil society in the Middle East and North Africa.

John P. Entelis, professor and chair of political science, Fordham University, published “Islamic Awakening” in Great Decisions 2014 Edition (Foreign Policy Association). The article traces North Africa’s precarious transition, from Arab revolt to Islamic awakening.

Vladimir Gel’man, professor of political science and sociology, European University at St. Petersburg, won the Russian Political Science Association’s 2013 Best Popular Book Award for his book (in Russian), Iz Ognya da v Polymy: Rossiiskaya Politika Posle SSSR (BHV-Peterburg).

Edward L. Gibson, professor and chair of political science, Northwestern University, received two awards for his book, Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics, 2012): the 2014 V.O. Key Award for Best Book in U.S. Southern Politics, awarded by the Southern Political Science Association, and the 2013 Donna Lee Van Cott Award for Best Book in Latin American Political Institutions, awarded by the Latin American Studies Association.

Sheena Chestnut Greitens, assistant professor, University of Missouri, and academy scholar, Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, joined the Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy as a non-resident senior fellow in January 2014.

Henry E. Hale, associate professor of political science and international affairs, George Washington University, published “Did the Internet Break the Political Machine? Moldova’s 2009 ‘Twitter Revolution that Wasn’t’” in the Fall 2013 Demokratizatsiya. The article downplays the role of social media during Moldova’s 2009 revolution, instead describing the event as the result of a succession crisis.


Evelyn Huber, distinguished professor of political science, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, and John D. Stephens, Lenski Professor of Political Science and Sociology, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, were presented two awards by the American Sociological Association for their book, Democracy and the Left: Social Policy and Inequality in Latin America (University of Chicago Press): the Political Economy of the World System Section’s 2013 Best Book award and the Sociology of Development Section’s 2013 Outstanding Book Award. The book finds that leftist movements in Latin American democracies have successfully reduced poverty and inequality over time.

Krzysztof Jasiewicz, the William P. Ames, Jr. Professor in Sociology and Anthropology, Washington and Lee University, is now editor of East European Politics & Societies and Cultures, an international, interdisciplinary journal for the examination of critical issues related to Eastern Europe, established in 1986 and published by Sage on behalf of the American Council of Learned Societies. He shares editorial duties with Wendy Bracewell of University College London.

Carl LeVan, assistant professor, American University, and Joseph Oleyinka Fashagba held a two-day seminar on “African State Legislatures: Subnational Politics and
National Power” at Landmark University in Kwara State, Nigeria, from January 7-8. The papers are available for download at http://carllevan.com/research/state-legislatures-fashagba/ and are currently being revised for submission as an edited volume with the help of an American Political Science Association Africa Workshop Alumni Publications Grant.

Staffan I. Lindberg (PI) was awarded a SEK37.6mn (USD 5.8mn) grant from Riksbankens Jubileumsfond to do research on Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). The core 15 V-Dem researchers are all involved in this grant, including co-PIs Jan Teorell (Lund University), Michael Coppedge (University of Notre Dame), John Gerring (Boston University), Svend-Erik Skanning (Aarhus University), and Michael Bernhard (University of Florida). On the same day that the announcement of this grant was made, Lindberg was also notified that University of Gothenburg’s Vice Chancellor has promised Lindberg to Professor of Political Science. In December, Lindberg resigned from his position as associate professor at the University of Florida.

Lindberg and collaborators organized a 4-day workshop at University of Gothenburg 21-24 October 2013, with V-Dem Regional Managers (24 of them coming from across the world from, e.g. Manilla, Beirut, Lusaka, Bishkek, Santiago, etc.) and Project Managers. The workshop was on quality control for the 84 countries where data collection has finished and on aggregation of indicators into components and measures of varying democratic dimensions. This was followed by a public V-Dem conference on October 25 with some 50 attendees representing over 25 ministries, donors, international organizations, and think tanks.

Scott Mainwaring, Eugene and Helen Conley Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán published Democracies and Dictatorships: Emergence, Survival, and Fall (Cambridge University Press). The book examines the rise and fall of Latin American political regimes since 1900. Using an elite-driven framework, the book explains regime outcomes and demonstrates the importance of “transnational forces” to waves of democratization.

Mainwaring will also spend the 2013-14 academic year teaching in Notre Dame’s London Program.

Ragnhild L. Muriaas, associate professor of comparative politics, University of Bergen, guest-edited the November-December 2013 Women’s Studies International Forum alongside Liv Tønnessen and Vibeke Wang. The issue, which focused on Democratization and Gender Quotas in Africa, featured contributions from: Alice Kang, Gretchen Bauer and Jennie E. Burnet; Vibeke Wang, Liv Tønnessen and Samia al-Nagar; Hanane Darhour and Drude Dahlérup; Mi Yung Yoon, Ragnhild L. Muriaas and Happy Kayuni; and Mona Lena Krook.

Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux, Ph.D. candidate, Tufts University, has returned from Libya where he spent over a year collecting data on civil society. His work involved surveying seven-hundred civil society leaders in five major Libyan cities and conducting semi-structured interviews with key activists. His research aims to clarify the relationship between individual and community and the type and level of associational life.

Andreas Schedler, professor of political science, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica, published The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism (Oxford University Press). Using original cross-country data, the book describes the uncertainty inherent in authoritarian rule and the resulting electoral struggles between authorities and dissidents.

Schedler also published “The Criminal Subversion of Mexican Democracy” in the January 2014 Journal of Democracy, in which he argues that democracy can be subverted not only from above by the authorities, but also from below by criminal organizations.

Holli A. Semetko, Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Media and International Affairs and professor of political science, Emory University, is a 2013-14 Fulbright Nehru Scholar and honorary visiting professor at the Indian Institute of Technology in Mumbai. Semetko’s comparative research on India includes influence, strategy, and media in companies, campaigns, and elections. The United States India Education Foundation (USIEF) and the governments of both countries support the Fulbright Nehru Scholar program.

David S. Siroky, assistant professor of politics and global studies, Arizona State University, published “Lost Autonomy, Nationalism and Separatism” with John Cuffe in the January 2014 Comparative Political Studies.


Alexei Trochev, associate professor of political science, Nazarbayev University, and Rachel Ellett published “Judges and Their Allies: Rethinking Judicial Autonomy through the Prism of Off-Bench Resistance” in the Spring 2014 Journal of Law and Courts. The authors argue that off-bench judicial resistance against blatant interference supported by vibrant social networks is an important
manifestation of judicial autonomy in hybrid political regimes, clarify the logic of this resistance, outline a taxonomy of five strategies of resistance, and explain the political implications of off-bench judicial behavior.


Ashutosh Varshney, Sol Goldman Professor of International Studies and the Social Sciences, Brown University, published Battles Half Won: India's Improbable Democracy (Penguin India) in November 2013. Varshney describes the improbable consolidation of India's multi-lingual, multi-ethnic, and multi-faith democracy since 1947, examining themes including Hindu nationalism, economic reform, and ethnofederalism.

Leonardo A. Villalón, professor of political science and African Studies, University of Florida, has been named Dean of the University of Florida International Center, effective January 2014.

Robert D. Woodberry, associate professor, National University of Singapore, won the 2013 Award for Excellent Research from the National University of Singapore, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. It recognizes the NUS faculty member who had the most significant research accomplishment in the previous year.

NEW RESEARCH

Journal of Democracy

The January 2014 (Vol. 25, no. 1) Journal of Democracy features a cluster of articles on “The Legacies of 1989,” as well as individual case studies on the subversion of Mexican democracy, the role of state-run media, the “transition paradigm,” Albania, Georgia, and constitutions in Afghanistan. “The Criminal Subversion of Mexican Democracy” by Andreas Schedler

In recent years, Mexico has stumbled into an encounter with collective violence, this time in the form of the “drug war.” Among its many harms is the damage it is doing to Mexican democracy.

The Legacies of 1989

I. “The Transformative Power of Europe Revisited” by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi

Improving governance in the EU’s new member states remains a huge challenge for the European project. Why has the EU succeeded in promoting democracy among its postcommunist members but failed in promoting good governance?

II. “Bulgaria’s Year of Civic Anger” by Venelin I. Ganev

In 2013, Bulgaria’s historically passive citizenry exploded in outrage over soaring energy bills and shady elite actions. What does Bulgaria’s year of protest tell us about how civic anger is generated and when it becomes a transformative political resource?

III. “Myths and Realities of Civil Society” by Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik

The changes that civil societies in Central and Eastern Europe have experienced since communism’s fall are real, but often misunderstood.

IV. “The Moving Ruins” by Vladimir Tismaneanu

Communism is gone, but while it was alive and in power it bred profound moral pathologies that still haunt the region.

“Breaking the News: The Role of State-Run Media” by Christopher Walker and Robert W. Orttung

“New media” may generate a lot of buzz, but authoritarian regimes are proving disturbingly adept at countereacting them and at using more traditional media to help themselves hang on to power.

“Reconsidering the ‘Transition Paradigm’

Four leading experts on democracy—Larry Diamond, Francis Fukuyama, Donald L. Horowitz, and Marc F. Plattner—discuss the relevance of the “transition paradigm” in light of the “Arab Spring” and other developments in the world today.

“Mediterranean Blues: The Crisis in Southern Europe” by Matthias Matthijs

Reset by economic and political crises, democracy in southern Europe has been eroding, along with support for the EU. These developments stem largely from the design of the euro, which denies key economic-policy tools to national governments.

“What Can Constitutions Do? The Afghan Case” by Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq

January 2014 marks the tenth anniversary of Afghanistan’s constitution. In what areas has it succeeded or failed? Judging by its achievements with respect to four midrange goals, the document has a record that is decidedly mixed.

“The Crisis of Liberalism” by Pierre Manent

Liberalism as a governing order is barely two centuries old. A response to the great alternatives presented by Europe’s political history, it represents a unique synthesis of the ancient and the modern. But globalization has cast a deep shadow across liberalism’s future.

“Albania: From Bunkers to Ballots” by Ivana Cvjetkovic Bajrovic and Janet Rabin Satter

After a half-century of brutal communist rule and two decades of troubled postcommunist life, this small Balkan state surprised many by achieving a successful turnover of power by means of the ballot.

“Georgian Democracy: Seizing or Losing

24
the Chance?" by Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr.
A year after the election that ended the
rule of President Mikheil Saakashvili’s
National Movement, Georgia has seen
further remarkable developments that raise
key questions for struggling postcommunist
democracies and, indeed, democracies
everywhere.

Democratization

The December 2013 (Vol. 20, no. 7)

Democratization includes articles on
corruption, electoral law violations, civil
war, and EU democracy promotion in
Central and Eastern Europe.

“Internationalized Regimes: A Second
Dimension of Regime Hybridity” by Oisín
Tansey

“Constraining Political Corruption: An
Empirical Analysis of the Impact of
Democracy” by Alessandro Pellegata

“Does Civil War Breed Authoritarian
Values? An Empirical Study of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia” by
Karin Dyrstad

“Election Law Violations as Campaign
Effort: Turnout in Japan’s House of
Councillors Elections” by Matthew Carlson
and Steven R. Reed

“Enforcing Consensus? The Hidden Bias
in EU Democracy Promotion in Central
and Eastern Europe” by Katrine Hauknes
and Annette Freyberg-Inan

“Voter Attitudes when Democracy
Promotion Turns Partisan: Evidence from
a Survey-Experiment in Lebanon” by
Nikolay Marinov

“Islamist Moderation in Perspective:
Comparative Analysis of the Moderation
of Islamist and Western Communist
Parties” by Suveyda Karakaya and A. Kadir
Yildirim

The November 2013 (Vol. 20, no. 6)

Democratization includes articles on
political change in the Middle East,
Indonesia, Turkey, Timor-Leste, and
Colombia.

“Explaining (and Re-Explaining) Political
Change in the Middle East during the Arab
Spring: Trajectories of Democratization
and of Authoritarianism in the Maghreb”
by Frédéric Volpi

“Indonesia’s ‘Democratic Transition’
Revisited: a Clientelist Model of Political
Transition” by Yuki Fukushima

“Democratization and the Politicization
of Religious Civil Society in Turkey” by Ani
Sarkissian and Ş. İlkgü Özler

“Contentious Politics and Student
Dissent in the Twilight of the Portuguese
Dictatorship: Analysis of a Protest Cycle”
by Guya Accornero

“The Politics of Security Sector Reform
in ‘Fragile’ or ‘Post-Conflict’ Settings:
A Critical Review of the Experience in
Timor-Leste” by Selver B. Sahin and
Donald Feaver

“Is It None of Their Business? Business and
Democratization, The Case of Turkey” by
Isik Ozel

“Security and Economic Voting: Support
for Incumbent Parties in Colombian
Presidential Elections” by Jennifer S.
Holmes and Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de
Piñeres

“The Reform-Security Dilemma in
Democratic Transitions: the Turkish
Experience as Model?” by Ersel Aydinli

SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES
ON DEMOCRACY

This section features selected articles on
democracy that appeared in journals
received by the NED’s Democracy Resource
Center, October 1, 2013—February 1, 2014.

African Affairs, Vol. 113, no. 450, January
2014

“Neo-Patrimonial Politics in the ANC” by
Tom Lodge

“Weak Legislatures, Failing MPs, and the
Collapse of Democracy in Mali” by Martin
van Vliet

“Somalia Works: Police Development as
State Building” by Alice Hills

American Political Science Review, Vol.
107, no. 3, August 2013

“Organizing Rebellion: Rethinking High-
Risk Mobilization and Social Networks in
War” by Sarah Elizabeth Parkinson

“Quality of Government: Toward a More
Complex Definition” by Marcus Agnafors

“Quality Over Quantity: Amici Influence
and Judicial Decision Making” by Janet M.
Box-Steffensmeier, Dino P. Christenson,
and Matthew P. Hitt

“Empowering Women through
Development Aid: Evidence from a
Field Experiment in Afghanistan” by
Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, Ruben
Enikolopov

“Perils or Promise of Ethnic Integration?
Evidence from a Hard Case in Burundi” by
Cyrus Samii

“The Semblance of Democratic Revolution:
Coalitions in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution”
by Mark R. Beissinger
**New Research**

**Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 46, no. 3, September 2013**
“Continuity and Change in Russia’s Policy toward Central and Eastern Europe” by Yuri E. Fedorov

**Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, no. 10, October 2013**
“The Behavioral Foundations of Social Politics: Evidence from Surveys and a Laboratory Democracy” by Benjamin Barber IV, Pablo Beramendi, and Erik Wibbels

“Attitude Variability Among Latin American Publics: How Party System Structuration Affects Left/Right Ideology” by Imke Harbers, Catherine E. de Vries, and Marco R. Steenbergen

“Campaign Spending in Proportional Electoral Systems: Incumbents Versus Challengers Revisited” by Joel W. Johnson

“Violence Against Civilians in the Second Intifada: The Moderating Effect of Armed Group Structure on Opportunistic Violence” by Devorah Manekin

“Mainstream or Niche? Vote-Seeking Incentives and the Programmatic Strategies of Political Parties” by Thomas M. Meyer and Markus Wagner

“Catchall or Catch and Release? The Electoral Consequences of Social Democratic Parties’ March to the Middle in Western Europe” by Johannes Karreth, Jonathan T. Polk, and Christopher S. Allen

“When Parties Meet Voters: Assessing Political Linkages Through Partisan Networks and Distributive Expectations in Argentina and Chile” by Ernesto Calvo and Maria Victoria Murillo


“Striking Concessions from Governments: The Success of General Strikes in Western Europe, 1980–2009” by Kerstin Hamann, Alison Johnston, and John Kelly

“Whither Clientelism? Good Governance and Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program” by Natasha Borges Sugiyama and Wendy Hunter

“Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties: Comparing Shari’a Politics in Two Indonesian Provinces” by Michael Buehler

**Comparative Politics, Vol. 45, no. 4, July 2013**
“Regime Legacies and Levels of Democracy: Evidence from Latin America” by Aníbal Pérez-Liñán and Scott Mainwaring

“Electing Extremists? Party Primaries and Legislative Candidates in Mexico” by Kathleen Bruhn

“Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption? When Will Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?” by Matthew S. Winters and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro

“Political Representation in Microstates: The Cases of St. Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles, and Palau” by Wouter Veenendaal

“Perspectives on the Power and Persistence of States in Africa and Beyond” by Erin Hern

**Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 21, no. 3, Summer 2013**
“Patterns of Electoral Contestation in Russian Regional Assemblies: Between ‘Competitive’ and ‘Hegemonic’ Authoritarianism” by Petr Panov and Cameron Ross

“Party System Institutionalization in Ukraine” by Olena Rybiy

“The Negative Consequences of Proportional Representation in Ukraine” by Serhij Vasylychenko

**East European Politics, Vol. 29, no. 2, May 2013**
“State Functions and Media Politics: Case Study on Print Media in Slovenia” by Nikolai Genov

**International Political Science Review, Vol. 34, no. 5, November 2013**
“The Internet: A New Route to Good
Comparative Democratization

Vol. 12 No. 1                                                                               March 2014

New Research

“Why Do People Vote? Rationality or Emotion” by Ching-Hsing Wang

“A Right-to-Left Policy Switch? An Analysis of the Honduran Case under Manuel Zelaya” by Clayton M. Cunha Filho, André Luiz Coelho, and Fidel I. Pérez Flores

“Repression, Political Threats, and Survival under Autocracy” by Abel Escribà-Folch

“Voting Differently across Electoral Arenas: Empirical Implications from a Decentralized Democracy” by Pedro Riera

International Political Science Review, Vol. 34, no. 4, September 2013

“Is Corruption an Enemy of Civil Society? The Case of Central and Eastern Europe” by Patty Zakaria

“Opening Pandora’s Box? Inclusive Institutions and the Onset of Internal Conflict in Oil-Rich Countries” by Tim Wegenast

“Changing the Rules of the Game: Determinants of Successful Electoral System Change in Central and Eastern Europe” by Philipp Harfst


“Second Time Around: Ex-Combatants at the Polls in Liberia” by Johanna Söderström

Middle East Journal, Vol. 67, no 3, Summer 2013

“Iran’s Basij: Membership in a Militant Islamist Organization” by Afshon Ostovar

“University under Siege: The Case of the Professors’ Basij Organization” by Saeid Golkar

Middle East Policy, Vol. 20, no. 3, Fall 2013

“Power Sharing in Syria: Lessons from Lebanon’s Taif Experience” by Stephan Rosiny

“Hamas and the Arab Spring: Strategic Shifts?” by Beverley Milton-Edwards

“The Rise of Militant Salafism in Azerbaijan and Its Regional Implications” by Emil Souleimanov and Maya Ehrmann

“Turkey Today: Headscarves and Women's Rights” by Marvine Howe

Middle East Policy, Vol. 20, no. 2, Summer 2013

“Order, Freedom and Chaos: Sovereignties in Syria” by George Abu Ahmad

“Creating Democrats? Testing the Arab Spring” by Ashley Barnes

“Transition in the Middle East: New Arab Realities and Iran” by Mahmood Sariolghalam

Party Politics, Vol. 19, no. 6, November 2013

“Analysing Multiparty Competition in Plurality Rule Elections” by Patrick Dunleavy and Rekha Diwakar

“Have the Cake and Eat It: The Rational Voter in Africa” by Staffan I Lindberg

Party Politics, Vol. 19, no. 5, September 2013

“Political Parties, Independents and the Electoral Market in sub-Saharan Africa” by John Ishiyama, Anna Batta, and Angela Sortor

“Measuring Vertical Integration in Parties with Multi-Level Systems Data” by Lori Thorlakson

“Do Electoral Coalitions Facilitate Democratic Consolidation in Africa?” by Danielle Resnick

“Beyond Outbidding? Ethnic Party Strategies in Serbia” by Christina Isabel Zuber

Party Politics, Vol. 19, no. 4, July 2013

“The Fate of Intra-Party Democracy: Leadership Autonomy and Activist Influence in the Mass Party and the Cartel Party” by Karl Loxbo

“The Politicization of Indigenous Identities in Peru” by Christopher Raymond and Moisés Arce

“How Things Fall Apart: Candidate Selection and the Cohesion of Dominant Parties in South Africa and Namibia” by Shane Mac Giollabhui

SELECTED NEW BOOKS ON DEMOCRACY

ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES


New Research


AFRICA


ASIA


EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION


LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN


MIDDLE EAST


COMPARATIVE, THEORETICAL, GENERAL


APSACD is the official newsletter of the American Political Science Association's Comparative Democratization section. Formerly known as CompDem, it has been published three times a year (October, January, and May) by the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies since 2003. In October 2010, the newsletter was renamed APSA-CD and expanded to include substantive articles on democracy, as well as news and notes on the latest developments in the field. The newsletter is now jointly produced and edited by faculty members of the University of Florida's Department of Political Science and the International Forum.

The current issue of APSA-CD is available here. A complete archive of past issues is also available.

To inquire about submitting an article to APSA-CD, please contact Staffan I. Lindberg, Benjamin Smith or Melissa Aten.

Executive Editors

**Staffan I. Lindberg** is a professor of political science at the University of Gothenburg. He is also PI (with John Gerring and Michael Coppedge) the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project; and a research fellow at the Quality of Government Institute. His research focuses on state building, political clientelism, political parties, legislative-executive relations, women's representation, voting behavior, elections, and democracy in Africa. He is the author of Democracy and Elections in Africa (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) and the editor of Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition? (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

**Benjamin Smith** is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His research focuses on ethnic conflict, regime change, and the politics of resource wealth. His first book, *Hard Times in the Land of Plenty: Oil Politics in Iran and Indonesia*, was published in 2007 by Cornell University Press, and his articles have appeared in *World Politics*, the *American Journal of Political Science*, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, *World Politics*, *Journal of International Affairs*, *Elections by Design: Parties and Patronage in Russia’s Gubernatorial (s)election in Russia and their influence on the of institutional choice, institutional development, and the influence of short-term electoral incentives on long-term political trajectories. His first book, *Elections by Design: Parties and Patronage in Russia’s Regions* (Northern Illinois University Press, 2006) explores the origins of Russia's sub-national legislative electoral systems. He has published numerous book chapters and articles, including works in *The American Journal of Political Science*, *Government and Opposition*, and the *Journal of Politics*. He is currently completing a co-authored book manuscript with William Reisinger (University of Iowa) that examines the links between federal elections and gubernatorial (s)election in Russia and their influence on the country's post-Soviet trajectory.

**Petia Kostadinova** is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Illinois Chicago (UIC). Dr. Kostadinova's main area of research involves the role of citizens' preferences, and media's transmission of these preferences, in shaping social and economic policies in the post-communist countries. A second stream of research focuses on the social and economic policies of the European Union. Prof. Kostadinova's research has been published in *Europe and National Economic Transformation: The EU After the Lisbon Decade*, Mitchell Smith, ed, the *European Journal of Communication*, the *Central European Journal of Communication*, and is forthcoming in *East European Politics and Journal of Communication & Mass Communication*.

**Bryon Moraski** is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His research considers the politics of institutional choice, institutional development, and the influence of short-term electoral incentives on long-term political trajectories. His first book, *Elections by Design: Parties and Patronage in Russia’s Regions* (Northern Illinois University Press, 2006) explores the origins of Russia's sub-national legislative electoral systems. He has published numerous book chapters and articles, including works in *The American Journal of Political Science*, *Government and Opposition*, and the *Journal of Politics*. He is currently completing a co-authored book manuscript with William Reisinger (University of Iowa) that examines the links between federal elections and gubernatorial (s)election in Russia and their influence on the country's post-Soviet trajectory.

**Conor O’Dwyer** is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His book
Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic Development examines the relationship between party-building and state-building in new democracies, looking specifically at the relationship between party competition and patronage politics in postcommunist Eastern Europe. His latest research examines the European Union’s use of conditionality to promote more liberal minorities policies in postcommunist states. Specifically, it examines the EU’s role in the contentious politics of homosexuality in postcommunist societies. Looking beyond just policy adoption, it examines the impact of EU-sponsored minority-rights policies: do they lead to shifts in attitudes regarding religious difference, national belonging, and minority rights?

Philip Williams is the director of the Center for Latin American Studies and a professor of political science and Latin American Studies at the University of Florida. He also co-directs the Latin American Immigrants in the New South project. His research interests include religion and politics, transnational migration, democratization, social movements, and civil-military relations. His latest book, A Place to Be: Brazilian, Guatemalan, and Mexican Immigrants in Florida’s New Destinations, was published by Rutgers University Press in 2009 and his articles have appeared in numerous academic journals, including Comparative Politics, Latin American Perspectives, Latin Studies, and the Journal of Latin American Studies.

Managing Editor
Melissa Aten-Becnel is the senior research and conferences officer at the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies and associate director of the Network of Democracy Research Institutes. She earned an M.A. from The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, where she focused on foreign policy and Central Europe.

Leonardo A. Villalón is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His research has focused on Islam and politics and on democratization in West Africa, particularly Senegal, Mali, and Niger. He is the author of Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal (Cambridge University Press, 1995) and co-editor of The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration (Lynne Rienner, 1998) and The Fate of Africa’s Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions (Indiana University Press, 2005), as well as of numerous articles and book chapters on politics and religion in West Africa.

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Adam Bilinski received a B.A. in International Relations at the University of Warsaw (Poland) and M.A. in Social Sciences from the University of Chicago. Currently he is a PhD student in Political Science at the University of Florida with specialization in comparative politics. His research interests include the problems of survival of democracy, electoral revolutions and democracy promotion. He is currently working on his dissertation, which evaluates how pre-democratization historical legacies (in the form of pre-democratization regime discontinuities and regime type both in independent states and colonies) conditioned the probability of survival of once-established democracies.